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I.

INTRODUCTION

Winston Churchill once noted that "[i]f we open a quarrel
between the past and the present, we shall find that we have lost
the future."' While this statement is almost a truism, unfortunately
it is not one that has been universally recognized in the ongoing
* Member, District of Columbia Bar. Commissioner, United States Atomic Energy Commission, 1971-1974. A.B., Washington and Jefferson College, 1953; LL.B., University of
Maryland, 1956.
** Member, District of Columbia Bar. Special Counsel, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1975-1977. B.A., University of Virginia, 1971; J.D., University of Georgia,
1973.
1. Address, House of Commons (June 18, 1940), reprinted in J. BARTLrr, FAmauAR
QUOTATIONS 921 (14th ed. 1968).
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debate over the proper controls that should be exerted over international nuclear commerce. 2 Unlike the vast majority of items in
transnational trade, nuclear-related transfers from their inception
have been governed by an international legal regime providing for
nondiscriminatory access to materials and equipment in exchange
for assurances against their misuse for military purposes. Consisting
of an intricate array of multilateral and bilateral agreements, this
superstructure has permitted peaceful applications of nuclear energy to move from the laboratory to industrial maturity within
twenty-five years, while providing a significant deterrent to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 3
Despite the broad acceptance of this regime among countries of
differing political persuasions, several nations, including the United
States, have recently upset the delicate balance between access to
supplies and safeguards by imposing unilaterally new and more
stringent conditions on their nuclear exports. While it may be natural for each generation to reexamine its predecessor's policies, these
actions threaten to undermine the foundation of the existing superstructure at a particularly difficult time in trade relations between
the developed and developing nations. Many states believe that the
key tradeoffs embodied in the less-than-ten-year-old NonProliferation Treaty' remain valid today. The result is a lack of
current stability in international nuclear commerce and an attendant weakening of the broad-based consensus that heretofore had
joined the nations of the world. If this trend continues, the possibility that a number of additional nations will acquire nuclear weapons
increases dramatically.
Because of and perhaps despite these events, the international
community is moving slowly toward a consensus on a new nonproliferation regime. While only its broad outlines are now apparent and
many obstacles still remain, this regime will augment the foundations of the current legal system by prescribing a more detailed code
of conduct governing international nuclear energy cooperation. In so
2. See, e.g., H.R. 15377, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin H.R. REP. No. 1469, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976).
3. Proliferation falls into two categories: vertical proliferation, which refers to an increase in the number and types of nuclear weapons possessed by weapons states; and horizontal proliferation, which refers to the spread of nuclear weapons or the ability to make them
by nonweapons states. Control of vertical proliferation is the purpose of the strategic arms
limitations talks (SALT). Control of horizontal proliferation is the purpose of the web of
treaties, international agreements, and other arrangements discussed in this Article.
4. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1,
1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter cited as NonProliferation Treaty]. One hundred and four nations have now ratified the Treaty.
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doing, the international community will be taking an unparalleled
step. Never before has a vital commodity in transnational commerce been regulated in this manner. This regime could become a
paradigm for conjugating future international legal regimes governing complex technologies.

II.

1954-1973:

CREATION OF THE CURRENT
INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR REGIME

On few matters have the
willingness to work together
guarding of the peaceful uses
ginning of this effort in the

nations of the world shown a greater
than on the development and safeof nuclear energy. From the very bemid-1940's,5 the international com-

5. The first multinational effort to deal with nuclear energy on an international scale
was the Three Nation Agreed Declaration, in which the United States, the United Kingdom,
and Canada agreed to share with all nations the scientific information associated with the
peaceful development of atomic energy. The Declaration acknowledged, however, that the
information required for the industrial development of nuclear energy was virtually the same
as that needed for weapon production. It was agreed, therefore, that it was necessary to
withhold this information until appropriate safeguards could be established to insure that the
information would be used only for peaceful purposes. To this end, the three heads of state
suggested that the United Nations establish a commission that would make recommendations regarding the international control of nuclear energy. See U.S. DEPT OF STATE Pus. No.
2702, THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY, GROWTH OF A PoucY (1947). The
U.S.S.R. agreed to these principles the next month in the Moscow Declaration, a joint U.S.U.K.-U.S.S.R. statement that contained the text of a proposed United Nations resolution to
establish the commission. Id. at 125-27. This resolution was accepted by the General Assembly a short time later. G.A. Res. 1, U.N. Doc. A/64 (1946), reprinted in 1 UNITED NATIONS
REsOLUTIONs, 1946-1948, at 5 (D. Djonovich ed. 1973).
In an attempt to give substance to the proposal to share nuclear-related information, the
first United States representative to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission
(UNAEC), Bernard Baruch, in a plan that was to later bear his name (although the speech
was based on the Acheson-Lilienthal Report), proposed the creation of an International
Atomic Energy Development Authority. This Authority would be entrusted with all phases
of the development and use of atomic energy. It would control or own all atomic energy
activities potentially dangerous to world security, and would control, license, and inspect all
others. Its functions would include fostering the beneficial uses of atomic energy and conducting research and development in the field in order to remain at the forefront of new developments. Once the Authority was established, the production of all nuclear weapons would be
halted and existing nuclear weapons would be destroyed. Moreover, the Authority would
possess all the information associated with atomic energy. Statement by Bernard M. Baruch,
United States Representative to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (June 14,
1946), reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON GoVERNMENr OPERATIONS, 94TH CONG., 1ST Sass., PEACEFuL NUCLEAR ExPoRTs AND WEAPONS PROLIFERATION: A COMPENDIUM 203 (Comm. Print 1975)
[hereinafter cited as COMPENDIUM].
While the United Nations was discussing the Baruch plan, the United States Congress
passed the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755 (repealed
1954). This Act forbade the exchange of information with foreign countries on the use of
atomic energy for industrial purposes until Congress declared "by joint resolution that effective and enforceable international safeguards against the use of atomic energy for destructive
purposes have been established." Id. § 10(a)(1), 60 Stat. at 766. Such a joint resolution had
not been passed at the time the Act was repealed.
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munity recognized that the development of nuclear energy was accompanied by the danger that nations could use its fruits for military purposes. This awareness arose from two immutable facts: (1)
all forms of nuclear reactors involve the use and/or generation of
materials that are capable of being employed in nuclear explosive
devices;' and (2) any moderately industrialized nation has the technological ability to convert or reprocess the irradiated fuel removed
from the reactor into a material directly usable in a nuclear weapon,
employing unclassified information and commercially available
materials and equipment.7 Given the early widespread distribution
of fissionable materials, the individual states found themselves in
an extremely powerful yet impotent position. Thus, the nations
found it advantageous to collaborate in the establishment of institutional mechanisms that would give them access to the materials and
equipment necessary for peaceful purposes, while assuring the rest
of the world that the transfers would not be diverted to military
uses.
The symmetry between supply and safeguards is evident in the
two cornerstones of the present international regime-the Statute
of the International Atomic Energy Agency' and the NonProliferation Treaty. The former established an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under the aegis of the United Nations
for the twin purposes of facilitating the distribution and safeguarding of materials and equipment in international nuclear commerce.
While the protective function of the IAEA has drawn the most attention over the past several years, the Agency also was conceived
6. Most nuclear reactors in operation today use uranium or its byproduct as fuel. As
uranium exists in nature, its ore contains about 0.7% U-235. To make it acceptable for use
in a reactor, the ore must be refined and converted into various chemical forms and then, in
most cases (the exception being the so-called heavy water reactors), "enriched" in U-235
content. The resulting compounds are fabricated into fuel pellets and placed in metal tubes
to form fuel rods. These fuel rods are irradiated in the reactor, in which the fissile U-235 bums
up and plutonium is created. Plutonium can be used as material for a nuclear weapon once
it is separated in pure form from the fuel rod; the low-enriched uranium used in most reactors
cannot. It should be noted, however, that a few reactors do use high-enriched uranium, which
can also be employed in the production of nuclear weapons. Moreover, a few reactors use
thorium as a fuel. Its byproduct during irradiation is U-233, a very desirable weapons grade
material. See generally, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AssEssmT, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND SAFEGUARDs (1977).
7. Reprocessing is the step whereby the fuel assemblies are chopped into pieces or
dissolved and the residual uranium and plutonium are separated in streams from the fuel so
that they may be used for new fuel fabrication. Unlike an enrichment plant, the other
sensitive facility in the peaceful nuclear energy cycle, a reprocessing facility is relatively
inexpensive, small in size, and primarily an adaptation of commonly known chemical engineering processes. Id.
8. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, opened for signature Oct. 26,
1956, 8 U.S.T. 1093, T.I.A.S. No. 3873, 276 U.N.T.S. 3.
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to assist in the "development and practical application of, atomic
energy for peaceful uses throughout the world . . . ." Indeed, it

was given broad latitude "to perform any operation or service useful
in research on, or development or practical application of, atomic
energy for peaceful purposes,"" including acting as an intermediary
for the transfer of nuclear material, equipment, facilities, and services between members of the Agency."
As a counterbalance, the IAEA was required to administer safeguards on the materials and equipment it transferred in order to
ensure that they were not used for weapons purposes. The Agency
could also impose these safeguards at the request of the parties to a
multilateral agreement or at the request of an individual state concerning its own nuclear activities. 2 The broad scope of this protective function was unprecedented: the Agency's inspectors were
given the right to make on-site inspections with "access at all times
to all places and data . . . as necessary."" The Agency also was

given a discretionary right to designate the facilities in which plutonium in excess of the country's peaceful needs was to be stored. 4
In the event any state did not fulfill its obligations under the Statute, the IAEA was required to suspend or terminate its assistance
and withdraw any material or equipment supplied by it or a member'l-a potentially significant penalty in view of the role of the
Agency in transferring such material and equipment."
The Non-Proliferation Treaty adds to both sides of this balance, guaranteeing its adherents the benefits of nuclear technology
in exchange for their agreement not to develop nuclear weapons and
to submit to a broad range of inspections to verify this undertaking.
More specifically, states without nuclear weapons must agree to
renounce the acquisition of such weapons and to open all activities
within their jurisdictions involving nuclear materials to IAEA
inspection." In return, they receive the assurance that the safe9. Id. art. m(A)(1), 8 U.S.T. at 1095, 276 U.N.T.S. at 6. One hundred and one nations
have now joined the IAEA.
10. Id.
11. Id. See also id. art. IX, 8 U.S.T. at 1102, 276 U.N.T.S. at 18.
12. Id. art. XII, 8 U.S.T. at 1105, 276 U.N.T.S. at 26.
13. Id. art. XII(A)(6), 8 U.S.T. at 1106, 276 U.N.T.S. at 28.
14. Id. art. XII(A)(5), 8 U.S.T. at 1106, 276 U.N.T.S. at 27-28.
15. Id. art. XII(C), 8 U.S.T. at 1107, 276 U.N.T.S. at 28.
16. See Doub & Dukert, Making NuclearEnergy Safe and Secure, 53 FOREIGN Ave. 756,
757-72 (1975) (discusses the growth of IAEA activities). See also Szasz, InternationalAtomic
Energy Agency Safeguards, in INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS AND NUCLEAR INDUSTRY 73 (M.
Willrich ed. 1973), reprintedin COMPENDIUM, supra note 5, at 884.
17. Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 4, arts. II, III, 21 U.S.T. at 487, 729 U.N.T.S.
at 171.
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guards will be implemented in a manner that avoids "hampering
the economic or technological development" of this energy source.,'
They also receive assurance that:
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable
right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use
of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.
2. All the parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to
participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing
alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further
development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with
due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world."

Finally, all parties to the Treaty undertake to require IAEA safeguards on all transfers of nuclear material and equipment to nonnuclear-weapons states.o
This symmetry is further reinforced by a variety of multilateral
and bilateral agreements, including the nuclear weapons free zone
in Latin America, 21 the nuclear common market in Europe, 22 and
bilateral agreements providing the basic framework for nuclear
trade between individual nations. The United States bilateral
agreements are of particular relevance. Invariably, these agreements have followed a similar format." The United States agrees to
cooperate with the recipient in the provision of materials, equipat 172.
19. Id. art. IV, 21 U.S.T. at 489-90, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172-73.
20. Id. art. m(2), 21 U.S.T. at 488, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172. It sould be noted that two
nuclear weapons states-France and the People's Republic of China-are not parties to the

18. Id. art. I(3), 21 U.S.T. at 487, 729 U.N.T.S.

Treaty, nor are a number of states that are believed to have both the technical capability
and the possible incentive to acquire nuclear weapons, such as Israel, Pakistan, India, Brazil,
and Argentina.
21. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, opened for
signature Feb. 14, 1967, 634 U.N.T.S. 281.
22. The Treaty of Rome, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3, provided for nuclear coopera-

tion among the members of the European Community in the Treaty Establishing the Euro-

pean Atomic Community (EURATOM), March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167. While the Treaty
permitted free transfer of nuclear materials among member states, it also required all nations
to submit to EURATOM safeguards. Like the provisions in the United States Agreements
for Cooperation, the Treaty mandates that signatories submit to EURATOM's detailed recordkeeping, accounting, and on-site inspection systems. Under the Treaty, EURATOM
must approve the techniques used for the chemical reprocessing of irradiated fuels and has
authority to require any excess special nuclear materials, not actually being used or ready
for use, to be deposited with the IAEA or in facilities that are or can be supervised by the
Commission.
23. See 1 U.S. ENERGY RESEARCH & DEV. AD., FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT, U.S.
NucLEAR EXPORT AcrIvrrlES 3-91 to 124 (1976) (ERDA-1542) [hereinafter cited as FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT].
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ment, and nonclassified technology. 2 ' The recipient grants the
United States certain safeguard rights, including inspections, to
guarantee that the materials and equipment are used solely for
peaceful purposes.21 The majority of these safeguard rights may be
transferred to the IAEA upon the conclusion of a trilateral agreement between the United States, the recipient, and the IAEA. 28The
United States, however, implicitly reserves the right to approve any
retransfer or reprocessing of material it supplies,? and it will assume
all safeguard rights under the bilateral agreement if the trilateral
agreement is suspended for any reason."
This comprehensive legal framework governing international
nuclear commerce was fundamentally established by 1970. The regime serves as a monument to the proposition that nations can act
in concert with neighbors of differing political persuasions when
they believe such actions are in their own best interests. In adopting
a multilateral mechanism with legal authority to monitor a nation's
conduct, the international community indicated its willingness to
join together to share the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy. However natural it might seem today, the concept that
compliance with an international obligation should and could be
verified by means such as sending international inspectors into the
territories of sovereign nations was then both bold and novel. Even
more remarkable is the rapidity with which the legal regime was
established. For perhaps the first time in the annals of international
law, a comprehensive legal regime replaced a vacuum within two
decades.
The practical results of this institutional framework, while
admittedly imperfect, have been extremely favorable. The maturation of nuclear energy has provided an invaluable contribution to a
24. See, e.g., Agreement for Cooperation for Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, July 11, 1969,
United States-Austria, 21 U.S.T. 10, T.I.A.S. No. 6815 (arts. m, IV, V, VII, VIII, X). While
such an agreement is a prerequisite to the receipt of facilities and special nuclear materials
from the United States, the United States usually is not obligated to provide these facilities
and materials. The recipient will obtain these supplies only upon the conclusion of contractual negotiations and the receipt of an export license. Id. art. m(A), 21 U.S.T. at 14.
25. Id. arts. IX, XI, XII, 21 U.S.T. at 19-28.
26. Id. art. XIII, 21 U.S.T. at 28. See, e.g., Agreement for the Application of Safeguards,
Aug. 20, 1969, United States-Australia-International Atomic Energy Agency, 21 U.S.T. 56,
T.I.A.S. No. 6816, 798 U.N.T.S. 77.
27. Agreement for Cooperation for Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, supra note 24. These
rights appear in articles IX and X respectively and not article XII-the safeguard rights that
are suspended.
28. Id. art. XIII, 21 U.S.T. at 28. While the suspending of a supplier's safeguards in
favor of those of the IAEA is almost universal, significant differences exist in the safeguards
required by the various suppliers. GENERAL AcCOUNTING OFFICE, OVERVIEW OF NUcLEAR EXPORT
POLICIES OF MAJOR FOREIGN SUPPLIER NATIONS (1977) [hereinafter cited as GAO OvERvIEw].
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world faced with limited energy options. The world's nuclear generating capacity has grown from five MWe (electrical megawatts) in
one nation in 1954 to over 100,000 MWe in twenty-two countries
today, with twice that capacity now under construction." This expansion was made possible by the smooth flow of nuclear technology, equipment, and material between nations. During this same
period the rate of proliferation slowed dramatically. Between 1945
and 1954 three nations developed nuclear explosives;:" in the next
decade two countries did likewise;31 in the last fourteen years only
one nation has done so. 3 1
Finally, it should be emphasized that the United States, as the
dominant supplier of both material and reactors throughout this
period, bore the principal responsibility for the creation of this regime. Indeed, the United States has been the catalyst in developing
international controls over nuclear-related transfers. While nuclear
technology eventually would have diffused throughout the international community, its rapid dissemination would not have occurred
without the Eisenhower Administration's decision to share the
United States advanced technological lead with other nations3 and
the passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,11 which reversed
previous law requiring secrecy on all nuclear processes. Moreover,
the IAEA, which was first proposed by the United States, was generally granted the same safeguard rights as the United States required
in its earliest bilateral agreements under the 1954 Act. Since the
Agency's inception, the United States has been unusually innovative and generous in its political and economic support.3 1 The
29. Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc., Fifth Annual International Reactor Survey (1978)
[hereinafter cited as AIF International Survey].
30. United States, United Kingdom, and U.S.S.R.
31. France and the People's Republic of China.
32. India.
33. See Address by President Dwight D. Eisenhower, General Assembly of the United
Nations (Dec. 8, 1953) (on the peaceful uses of atomic energy) reprintedin 1953 PUB. PAPERS
813 (1960) (papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower). While the United States did not sell the first
reactors used in foreign nuclear energy projects, its then dominant economic position coupled
with the extensive research involved in its nuclear submarine program provided it with a
significant advantage over its economic competitors. In fact, the United States supplied 99%
of the reactors sold in the noncommunist world through 1972. Nuclear Nonproliferationand
Export Controls: Hearings on S. 897 and S. 1432 Before the Subcomm. on Arms Control,
Oceans, and International Environment of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 100 (1977) (statement of Dwight J. Porter).
34. Pub. L. No. 83-703, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 919 (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
35. See W. Donnelly, Commercial Nuclear Power in Europe: The Interaction of American Diplomacy with a New Technology 46 (1972) (report prepared for the Congressional
Research Service of the Library of Congress), reprintedin COMPENDIUM, supra note 5, at 837.
See also U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, REPORT OF THE ADvIsoRY COMMITTEE ON U.S. Poucy TOWARD
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United States also conceived the idea of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, which it nurtured through prolonged negotiations and for
whose widespread acceptance it labored assiduously.',
Not only was the United States the prime formulator of this
nuclear framework, but its actions also provided the necessary degree of confidence in the regime to assure its broad support. The
United States made its uranium and reactors available on the world
market, thereby assuring other nations of an adequate supply. 7
While America maintained secrecy about its enrichment technology, it did not abuse its monopolistic commercial position. It took
repeated actions, including long-term supply contracts with attractive key contractual provisions, to respond to its customers' concerns over relying upon a single source." Aside from enrichment
technology, the United States declassified almost all other information relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including data
relating to reprocessing. 3' American reactor manufacturers were
freely permitted to license nuclear technology to foreign manufacturers, ensuring close international cooperation on nuclear matters. 0 Underlying these actions was the basic policy belief that
THE INTERNATIONAL AToMic ENERGY AGENCY (1962) (The Smythe Report), reprinted in
COMPENDIUM, supra note 5, at 221.
36. Id. It should be noted, however, that the United States, like all other suppliers,
historically has not required its trading partners to have ratified the Non-Proliferation
Treaty. See generally GAO OvERvIEw, supra note 28; FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT, supra
note 23, at 9-20. The Treaty prohibits any party from supplying to any nonnuclear-weapons
state (whether or not it is a party to the Treaty) certain types of nuclear items for peaceful
purposes, except subject to IAEA safeguards. Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 4, art.
M(2), 21 U.S.T. at 488, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2074 (1976). Nonenriched uranium could be exported despite the absence of an agreement for cooperation with the recipient. This effort was aided by attractive
financing terms. Through the first quarter of 1978, the United States Export-Import Bank
authorized nearly $2.8 billion in direct credits and $1.4 billion in guaranties. Remarks of John
L. Moore, Jr., President and Chairman, Export-Import Bank of the United States, to the
Conference on World Energy Economics, in London (April 27, 1978).
38. See E. WONDER, NUCLEAR FUEL. AND AMERICAN FOREIGN PoLIcY: MULTILATERALIZATION
FOR URANIUM ENRICHMENT (1977).
39. Major international conferences on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, held in
Geneva in 1955 and 1958, served as mechanisms for the dissemination of a vast body of
technical information on the subject. Enrichment technology, however, remained classified,
since the United States felt that these materials and processes were unique and the proliferation dangers sufficiently great that the technology should not be transferred. It should be
noted that the Department of Energy retains broad authority to prohibit such transfers under
the Atomic Energy Act even if the technology involved is unclassified. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2077(b)
(West Supp. I 1978).
40. In 1957 the Atomic Energy Commission generally authorized private parties in the
United States to conduct most forms of nuclear transactions outside of the Soviet Bloc,
subject to specific licensing requirements on the export of equipment and materials. 10 C.F.R.
pt. 810 (1978). The practical effect of this regulation was not only to permit normal commercial sales promotion efforts but also to open the door to the development of licensing arrange-
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peaceful nuclear activities could be undertaken without undue
threat to United States nonproliferative objectives so long as these
activities were subject to international safeguards.

Ill. 1973-1978:

THREATS TO THE REGIME

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 197811 marks the first
detailed amendment to the export regulatory regime established by
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. This legislation culminated four
years of intensive debate over the conditions under which the
United States should participate in international nuclear commerce. While reaffirming traditional American support for the
IAEA and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Non-Proliferation Act
nonetheless reflects an implicit belief that the regime mandated
therein is inadequate. Before proceeding to a detailed discussion of
the Act and its possible consequences, one should first put the Act
in historical perspective.
A. Breakdown of the InternationalConsensus
In 1973 international events began taking an ominous turn,
casting doubt on the efficacy of the existing nuclear legal regime.
The Arab oil embargo and the related four-fold increase in the cost
of oil stimulated a worldwide search for energy alternatives. Nations
began seeking the more sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle,42
and from the American perspective other suppliers seemed eager to
fulfill these requests. West Germany, for example, agreed to sell
Brazil a full nuclear fuel cycle capability in 1975, and during the
same year, France agreed to sell both Pakistan and South Korea a
reprocessing plant.13 In the closing days of the Nixon Administration, the United States also announced its intention to sell reactors
to Egypt and Israel. In connection with these arrangements, there
was concern that some suppliers were undercutting their competiments, joint ventures, and similar relationships between the United States and foreign firms.
The emergence of these relationships, which otherwise would have required time-consuming
requests for specific authorization on a case-by-case basis, is one of the key elements in the
development of nuclear power industries in Western Europe and Japan.
41. Pub. L. No. 95-242, 92 Stat. 120 (codified in scattered sections of 22, 42 U.S.C.A.).
42. One study by the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) assumes in its analysis that forty-six nations will have a reprocessing capability by 1990.
RICHARD J. BARBER ASSOCIATES, INC., REPORT ON LDC NucLEAR POWER PROSPECTS, 1975-90:
COMMERCIAL, ECONOMIC AND SEcuarry IMPLICATIONS v-5 (1975) (ERDA-52). ERDA was the
"promotional arm" of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) before it was folded into the
Department of Energy.
43. For a good study of the Brazil-West German deal and the United States reaction,
see H. HATENDoRN, THE NUCLEAR TRIANGLE: WASHINGTON, BONN AND BRASILIA: NATIONAL
NUCLEAR PoLIcIEs AND INTERNATIONAL PROLIFERATION (1978).
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tors' safeguard requirement to gain commercial advantages. Moreover, international terrorism was on the rise, and many governments feared the possibility of subnational theft and diversion of
nuclear materials." More importantly, in May 1974 India exploded
a "peaceful" nuclear device, indistinguishable from a nonpeaceful
one." In total effect, these events served to fracture the complacency
existing after the negotiation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
In early 1975 a small group of suppliers, at the initiative of the
United States, began meeting secretly in London to discuss means
to avoid discrepancies in safeguards caused by commercial considerations." By January 1976, participants in what had become known
as the London Suppliers Conference reached agreement on a broad
number of fronts. An exchange of letters moved the level and comprehensiveness of some areas of the international legal regime substantially beyond that contained in the Non-Proliferation Treaty."
In essence, the major suppliers agreed to the application of IAEA
safeguards on exports of material, equipment, technology, and replicated sensitive nuclear technology" in order to preclude their use in
44. While terrorist threats to nuclear material should not be disregarded, they cannot
be defined as proliferation as that term is used in this Article. This distinction is not artificial.
Terrorist threats to nuclear material are of a different nature and are susceptible to very
different forms of protection than are the risks of governmental diversion and national proliferation. Moreover, governments possess both resources and virtually unlimited authority,
including police power, to counter subnational threats, while the risks of national diversion
must be dealt with through the relatively limited tools of diplomacy, international institutions, and sanctions.
45. Nuclear explosives are qualitatively indistinguishable from a nuclear weapon, and
thus the two terms are used interchangeably in this Article. It should be noted that the
international community has not always been willing to accept this fact. See Doub & Dukert,
supra note 16, at 770.
46. A year earlier all major suppliers, with the exception of France, agreed upon the
so-called "Zangger List," which implemented article 111.2. of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The inclusion of an item on this list meant that its export would trigger IAEA safeguards
designed to ensure that these items were not used in any way for the development of nuclear
explosives and also to provide assurances that none of these items was re-exported without
similar safeguards. The "trigger list" included complete reactors, reactor components, and
certain important materials, such as heavy water and nuclear-grade graphite that are essential for the operation of certain types of reactors. IAEA, Information Circular No. 209 (Sept.
3, 1974), reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 543 (1975).
The initial concerns of the nuclear suppliers were formally expressed in the final declaration of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference held in Geneva in May 1975. This
declaration, adopted by consensus, urged that common export requirements relating to safeguards be strengthened.
47. It should be noted that the contents of these letters, which were modified on the
basis of later negotiations, were not made public until 1978. See, e.g., Letter from U.S.
Representative to the IAEA to the Director General of the IAEA, January 11, 1978, reprinted
in IAEA, Information Circular No. 254 (Feb. 1978). The inclusion of France, a non-Treaty
state, in the conference was particularly significant.
48. Id. § 6. Sensitive nuclear technologies refer to those relating to reprocessing, enrich-
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nuclear explosive devices, including those for peaceful purposes.
They also agreed to apply restraint in the transfer of sensitive technologies" and to accept special conditions governing the use or retransfer of sensitive material, equipment, and technologies. 0 As
compensation for these provisions, they pledged to encourage the
development of multinational regional facilities for reprocessing and
enrichment. Additionally, the suppliers agreed to require physical
security measures on exported nuclear facilities and materials.',
Finally, the suppliers provided for concerted action in the event of
safeguard violations,52 but they did not attempt to define the consequences to the erring state of any such transgression.
Concurrent with these developments, the United States, among
other nations,5 began reformulating its nuclear policies by taking
actions that ultimately led to the imposition of safeguards that went
beyond those agreed upon in London. In 1974 Congress modified the
Atomic Energy Act to require congressional review of new and
amended bilateral agreements relating to the provision of reactors."
Soon thereafter, Congress began considering the Export Reorganization Act of 1975.66 This measure was originally introduced as a proposal to reorganize the nuclear export functions of the United States
government. Succeeding versions, however, contained provisions
that would have mandated a massive realignment of agency responsibilities, including the establishment of licensing principles or
mandatory and inflexible licensing criteria, as well as frequent congressional review of individual export applications." The proposal
ment, or heavy water production.
49. Id. §§ 7-9.
50. Id. § 10.
51. Id. §§ 3, 11.
52. Id. § 14(c).
53. Like other supplier states, Canada concluded a series of bilateral arrangements with
consumer states in the 1950's to define the terms on which it would transfer nuclear material,
equipment, and technology. Since 1974, however, Canada has significantly revised its nuclear
export criteria twice. After India's explosion in 1974 of a peaceful nuclear device constructed
from plutonium that came from a Canadian-supplied research reactor, Canada undertook to
renegotiate all its existing agreements for cooperation to make clear its prohibition of peaceful
nuclear explosives constructed through the use of Canadian nuclear exports. The inability of
Canada to conclude such strengthened agreements with India and Pakistan resulted in the
suspension of all nuclear trade with those countries.
54. Pub. L. No. 93-485, § 1, 88 Stat. 1460 (current version at 42 U.S.C.A. § 2153 (West
Supp. I 1978)).
55. S. 1439, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. 10212, reprintedin Export Reorganization Act of 1975: Hearingson S. 1439 Before the Senate Comm. on Government Operations,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 499 (1975).
56. S. 1439, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in Export Reorganization Act of 1976,
Hearings on S. 1439 Before the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1255 (1976), modified version reprintedin S. 1439: Export ReorganizationAct of 1976:
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died with the expiration of the Ninety-fourth Congress,5 7 but it was
resurrected with the next Congress and ultimately passed two years
later.
The effect this flurry of congressional activity had upon other
segments of the United States government is difficult to gauge, but
it undoubtedly spurred a review of traditional American policies
and practices upon which the current regime was built. The effects
of this review became immediately evident. Frequent delays were
encountered on individual applications in the export process. 8 The
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)" began reviewing both conHearings on S. 1439 Before the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 68
(1976); H.R. 15419, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REc. 9491 (daily ed. Sept. 2, 1976); H.R.
15273, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REc. 9083 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1976); S. Res. 415, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REc. 8270 (1976); H.R. Res. 1076, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG.
REc. 5572 (1976).
For a detailed discussion of these proposals, see Doub & Fidell, InternationalRelations
and Nuclear Commerce: Developments in United States Policy, 8 LAw & PoL'Y INT'L Bus.
913, 927-51 (1976). See also Spodak, The Search for the Common Defense and Security in
the 94th Congress, 18 ATom. ENERGY L.J. 202 (1976).
57. The only new nuclear-related legislation enacted during the Ninety-fourth Congress
that affected United States nonproliferation policy was the International Security Assistance
and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-329, 90 Stat. 729 (codified in scattered
sections of 22 U.S.C.A.). Approved June 30, 1976, the law amended the Foreign Assistance
Act by adding a new section (the Symington Amendment) designed to control and reduce
the proliferation of materials that could be used by any country to produce nuclear weapons.
The 1976 Act specified that:
no funds [under this Act, or certain other Acts,] may be used for . . . economic assistance, . . . military or security supporting assistance [or] grant[s] [for] military
education and training, or [for] military credits or . . . guarantees, to any country
which . . . [1] delivers nuclear enrichment equipment, materials, or technology to any
other country or [2] receives such equipment, materials, or technology from any other
country, unless before such delivery(1) the supplying country and receiving country [agree to place all such items]
under multilateral auspices and management when available; and
(2) the recipient country [enters] into an agreement with the [IAEA] to place
all such [items] and all nuclear fuel and facilities in such country under [IAEA
safeguards].
Note that these sanctions were subsequently changed by the International Security Assistance Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-92, § 12, 91 Stat. 620 (codified at 22 U.S.C.A. § 2429 (West
Supp. 1978)). The Act also has a similar provision relating to reprocessing transfers. See
generally Doub & Fidell, supra note 56, at 923-27.
58. The first result was that no export licenses were issued for a short time, which led
to an extraordinary press release by the NRC stating that a moratorium was not in effect.
NRC Press Release No. 75-90 (April 15, 1975); see N.Y. Times, March 27, 1975, § 1, at 34,
col. 1 (entitled Nuclear Agency Suspends Export-Import of Reactors). This situation did not
improve greatly even after this "nonmoratorium" was lifted, with one application taking 30
months for approval. See generally, Weiss, The Role of the NRC in Export Licensing, 18
AToM. ENERGY L.J. 85 (1976).
59. Licensing functions are vested in the NRC pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 919 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.
and § 201(f) of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5841(f) (1976)).
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troversial and not-so-controversial exports at the Commission level.
The NRC forced the executive branch to justify its conclusions on
individual applications and used its licensing role as leverage to
achieve perceived national nonproliferation objectives. The executive branch, in turn, began employing a more diverse internal decisionmaking process, causing further delay." In contrast to its previous position, the executive branch began questioning the need for
several foreign reprocessing plants that it had already tacitly approved. Additionally, President Ford announced in the closing days
of the 1976 Presidential election campaign that the United States
would accelerate its initiatives with other nuclear suppliers and
customer nations to control the spread of plutonium and sensitive
nuclear technologies. As a first step, he decided the United States
would hold the domestic commercialization of reprocessing in abeyance pending the conclusion of a study to determine whether the use
of plutonium could proceed in a manner compatible with nonproliferation objectives. 6 1
B. The Nuclear Non-ProliferationAct of 1978
Whether implementation of the Ford policy would have alleviated the concerns causing the reexamination of traditional policies
is unknown, for within a week after its announcement James Earl
Carter, Jr., was elected President. As a candidate, Carter had stated
his intention to give nonproliferation concerns a high priority. In the
hope that the international community would follow the United
States lead, President Carter announced in April 1977 a major reformulation of American nuclear policy, including, inter alia, the indefinite deferral of commercial reprocessing and recycling of plutonium produced in the United States nuclear power program, a restructuring of the United States breeder program to give greater
priority to alternative designs, and the undertaking of an
"international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation" to consider these and
other issues in a multinational context.62 This statement went beyond the Ford policy in two major respects: (1) the Ford policy had
not treated the breeder as an immediate threat to nonproliferation
60. The executive branch review procedures were set forth in Exec. Order No. 11,902,
3 C.F.R. 88 (1976). It was revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,058, 43 Fed. Reg. 20,947 (May 11,
1978). For a detailed description of the decisionmaking process under Exec. Order No. 11,902,
see Westinghouse Electric Co., CLI-76-9, 3 NRC 739 (1976).
61. 12 WEEKLY COMP. OF PREs. Doc. 1624 (Oct. 28, 1976).
62. 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 502-04 (April 7, 1977). It should be noted that the
breeder now under development in most nations, the liquid-metal fast-breeder reactor, uses
plutonium as a fuel. The main advantage of breeders is that they can be operated to produce
more plutonium than they consume.
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since no decision on commercialization was expected for at least ten
years; and (2) the Carter program placed a heavy emphasis upon
alternatives to the present nuclear fuel cycle. In sum, the statement
reoriented United States nuclear policy-whereas the Ford policy
was directed toward finding means by which the United States
could live with the use of plutonium, the Carter program sought
ways to avoid it.
Accompanying this address and in the months immediately
thereafter, the Carter Administration undertook additional action
designed to increase the attractiveness of this policy to United
States trading partners. The Administration assured other nations
that the United States would remain a timely and reliable supplier.
In furtherance of this objective the United States announced plans
to increase its enrichment capacity and began taking new orders for
enrichment services for the first time since 1974.3 The Administration also announced the willingness of the United States to contribute to the development of international institutional arrangements
designed to insure vulnerable countries against interruptions in fuel
supplies." To alleviate the pressure for foreign reprocessing of spent
fuel, the Administration proposed that the United States accept
limited amounts of foreign-generated spent fuel when necessary to
further its nonproliferation objectives and undertook studies looking
toward the establishment of multinational storage centers."5 Finally,
the Carter Administration undertook to provide a United States
waste management plan that would examine, among other things,
the need for reprocessing prior to permanent disposal."
A year after its announcement, this policy was enacted, for the
most part, with the passage of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of
1978. While the theories underlying both the legislation and the
Carter policy were diverse and not always consistent, one can discern several common guiding concepts. Foremost among these was
the belief that past proliferation efforts based on the prevention of
the actual manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosive devices
was not adequate, given the increasing number of foreign programs
already having or contemplating the acquisition of reprocessing facilities. The use of these facilities would increase the amount of
separated plutonium available, facilitate national access to this
material, and raise problems qualitatively different from those asso63. Dep't of Energy News Release No. R-78-289 (July 28, 1978).
64. 13 WEEKLY COMP. oF PRs. Doc. 1566-67 (Oct. 19, 1977).
65. Dep't of Energy News Release No. DOE/SR-77-30 (Oct. 18, 1977).
66. See generally Report to the President by the Interagency Review Group on Nuclear
Waste Management, TID-28817 (Draft) (Oct. 1978) (hereinafter cited as IRG Report].
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ciated with light water reactors. First among these problems was
that weapons could be in place with virtually no advance notice to
permit effective diplomatic or other counter measures. Since the
barriers between peaceful and nonpeaceful uses were breaking
down, the Administration and Congress sought to broaden the focus
of United States nonproliferation efforts to ensure that between a
decision by a non-nuclear-weapon state to divert fissionable material and its actual fabrication into a nuclear explosive device sufficient time existed to allow the international community to undertake an appropriate political, diplomatic, or military response."
Thus, the Act imposed requirements for more stringent American
safeguard rights in bilateral agreements" and additional controls
over individual exports," as well as limitations upon the export of
certain technology and information.70 In the event that the recipient
violates safeguard obligations, and in certain other specified situations,7' the Act requires the termination of nuclear exports from the
67. The Non-Proliferation Act provides that the Secretary of Energy may not approve
any subsequent arrangement for reprocessing (or for the subsequent retransfer of more than
500 grams of plutonium) except in certain major facilities that have processed power reactor
fuel or have been the subject of a subsequent arrangement prior to the date of enactment,
unless such reprocessing or retransfer would not in his view and that of the Secretary of State
result in a significant increase in the risk of proliferation beyond that which existed at the
time approval was requested. In reaching this decision foremost consideration will be given
to whether the reprocessing or retransfer will take place under conditions that will insure
warning to the United States of any diversion well in advance of the time at which the nonnuclear-weapons state could transform the diverted material into a nuclear explosive device.
42 U.S.C.A. § 2160 (West Supp. I 1978) (adding a new § 131 to the Atomic Energy Act).
The Senate Report accompanying the bill that ultimately became law stated:
It is important to note that the standard of timely warning, the basic concept upon
which the entire international safeguards program rests, is strictly a measure of whether
warning of a diversion will be received far enough in advance of the time when the
recipient could transform the diverted material into an explosive device to permit an
adequate diplomatic response. The amount of warning time required will vary (and
cannot be defined in terms of a certain number of weeks or months) depending on the
type of resopnse [sic] would be needed-i.e., in some cases a bilateral response could
be adequate, whereas ain [sic] others a coordinated response by several nations and/or
international organizations would be necessary. In addition to determining the amount
of warning time required, it will be necessary to determine how much time will actualy
[sic] be available under any specific circumstances.
S. REP. No. 467, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1977), reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD.
NEWS 660, 670.

68. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2153 (West Supp. I 1978). See note 88 infra and accompanying text.
69. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2156-2157 (West Supp. I 1978) (adding new §§ 127 and 128 to the
Atomic Energy Act). See note 94 infra.
70. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2156-2157 (West Supp. I 1978). See also id. § 2153a (requiring
inclusion in agreements for cooperation for foreign enrichment of United States origin material and for exports of major critical components of sensitive nuclear facilities if such actions
are to occur).
71. These situations include:
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United States. 7 2 Additionally, the Act calls for the establishment of
multinational fuel centers under international auspices with limited
access to the sensitive technology involved.73
The development of a regime to place additional barriers between the peaceful and nonpeaceful uses of nuclear energy will take
time. Consequently, the Administration has emphasized and. the
Act implicitly recognizes the desirability of imposing a "need" concept on international nuclear commerce. For example, the United
States has opposed reprocessing for the purpose of recycling the
plutonium recovered in light water reactors as having only marginal
economic and energy supply benefits. Recognizing that the development and deployment of sensitive nuclear technologies cannot be
indefinitely delayed, however, the Administration has sought to
postpone this action until national energy programs can show a need
for such technology and the international community has time to
develop more effective proliferation-resistant programs. Relating
this theory to reprocessing, Joseph Nye,7 one of the principal theorists of the Administration's policy, has written:
Looking to the future, the Administration could envisage three components of a solution to the reprocessing problem-time, technology and institutions. If reprocessing is deferred until it is economically necessary, the world
gains considerable time to develop reprocessing technologies that do not provide ready access to weapons-usable materials and to design possible international facilities for reprocessing. Early commercialization of reprocessing in
national (or multinational) plants could deprive the world of the time to develop safer technologies and institutions."

While United States policy has emphasized this concept primarily
for plutonium-related activities, the Act seeks to promote the development of energy sources in developing countries other than nuclear
reactors by requiring the executive branch to assist these nations to
meet their energy needs through alternative energy sources.',
detonat[ing] a nuclear explosive device, . . . engag[ing] in activities involving ...
nuclear material and having direct significance for the manufacture or acquisition of
nuclear explosive[s], . . . [and] enter[ing] into an agreement after [the date of

enactment of this section] for the transfer of reprocessing equipment, materials, or
technology to the sovereign control of a non-nuclear-weapon state except . . . pursuant
to a subsequent international agreement or understanding to which the United States
subscribes . . . .
Id. § 2158 (adding a new § 129 to the Atomic Energy Act).
72. Termination is required "unless the President determines that cessation of such
exports would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States non-proliferation
objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security . . . ." Id.
73. Id. § 2153b.
74. Deputy to the Under-Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology from Jan. 20, 1977, to Dec. 31, 1978.
75. Nye, Nonproliferation:A Long-Term Strategy, 56 FoREIGN Asr. 601, 610 (1978).
76. 22 U.S.C.A. H§ 3261-3262 (West Supp. I 1978). It should be noted that the Adminis-
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While seeking tighter controls over international nuclear commerce, the Non-Proliferation Act also recognizes that nonproliferation is an international problem and that United States nonproliferation policy must reflect the realities of the current international
situation. Consequently, the Act reaffirms traditional United States
support for the IAEA and the Non-Proliferation Treaty." It also
implicitly notes that the decision by many nations not to build
nuclear explosives is a political one, not based on technical obstacles, and that this situation can best be maintained if these nations
perceive that the United States is a reliable supplier and that they
need not possess sensitive nuclear technologies.', The Act attempts
to resolve this problem through various means, including clarifying
previously uncertain licensing procedures and criteria," authorizing
the NRC to expedite license approval, 0 seeking more comprehensive international safeguards," and instituting a program for nuclear fuel assurances. 2 It further attempts to reflect worldwide realities by giving the executive branch substantial flexibility in implementing its provisions and by stating explicitly that nothing in the
Act prohibits the reprocessing of United States supplied fuel83 or
prejudices United States review of the results of the International
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation.8 1
The provisions of the Non-Proliferation Act are emblematic of
the diverse themes underlying it. Requiring the amendment of all
existing bilateral agreements within two years, subject to Presidential extensions with congressional review," the Act mandates the
tration would have deleted these sections from the Act.
77. Id. § 3241.
78. Id. § 3221.
79. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2155-2157 (West Supp. 11978) (adding new §§ 126-128 to the Atomic
Energy Act).
80. Id. § 2155(a)(2). This can be done in one of several ways: the Commission may make
a single finding for more than one application to the same nation, or it may approve licenses
merely by finding that there are no materially changed circumstances associated with the
application from those existing at the time of the last export to the same recipient. Id. The
Commission also has authority under § 161 of the Atomic Energy Act to issue general licenses
for such activities. 42 U.S.C. § 2201(h) (1976).
81. 22 U.S.C.A. § 3241 (West Supp. I 1978).
82. Id. § 3223.
83. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2160(d) (West Supp. I 1978).
84. Id.
85. Id. § 2153. See also id. H§ 2155(a)(2), 2159 (adding a new § 180 to the Atomic Energy
Act). The Act requires submissions to Congress in accordance with the procedures of § 2159
in four important instances: if the President decides to override the NRC on issuance of an
export license, § 2155(b)(2); if the President decides to exempt the nation from the additional
full-scope safeguard criterion, § 2157(b); if the President decides to waive a requirement for
the termination of exports, § 2158; and if any new or amended agreements for cooperation
are proposed, § 2153.
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inclusion of more stringent safeguard rights than previously have
been utilized. The most controversial provisions mandate that
United States agreements for cooperation include conditions that:
(1) non-nuclear-weapons states agree to full-scope IAEA safeguards; 6 (2) retransfers not occur without United States consent;
(3) material of United States origin or irradiated in United States
supplied facilities, not be reprocessed, enriched, or in some instances, otherwise altered in form or content without the prior approval
of the United States; (4) the United States approve the storage
facilities used for plutonium, U-233, or highly enriched uranium
that is of United States origin or derivation; and (5) derived material 7 be subject to all of the above requirements."
Not only does the Act impose greater substantive obligations
upon American trading partners, but it also greatly complicates the
United States nuclear decisionmaking process. Under the regulatory
regime of the 1954 Act, the NRC made the final decision on export
applications involving nuclear fuels and facilities" after consulting
with the executive branch.o For the most part, this review process
was informal and governed by interagency understandings. In making its determination the NRC was guided primarily by the broad
common defense and security standards of the Atomic Energy Act."
The Non-Proliferation Act substantially modified this regulatory regime. The NRC retains the principal decisionmaking role,
86. With full-scope IAEA safeguards, agency safeguards are required for all nuclear
activities within the jurisdiction of the recipient state. Id. § 2153(a) (2).
87. Derived material consists of material not of United States origin, but which is
irradiated in a United States-supplied reactor. Id. § 2153(a).
88. Id. § 2153. Other requirements of this section include provisions that the recipient
agree to maintain IAEA safeguards in perpetuity on the materials over which it has control,
not to use such material or equipment for explosive devices, and to permit the United States
to request the return of such materials and equipment if the cooperating party abrogates
IAEA safeguards or detonates a nuclear explosive. Section 2153 also requires the recipient to
maintain adequate physical security, to request United States consent before retransfering
restricted data, and impose similar conditions upon the product of any facility built with the
use of United States-supplied sensitive nuclear technology. Id.
89. NRC jurisdiction over the export of nuclear power reactors and fuel is provided for
in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2073, 2133, 2134, 2139 (1976). Its jurisdiction over components is found in 42
U.S.C. § 2139 (1976). It should be noted that this comprises only a small part of United States
nuclear cooperation with other nations. The Department of Energy (DOE), for example, has
jurisdiction over technology transfers (under 42 U.S.C.A. § 2077(b) (West Supp. I 1978)) and
shares jurisdiction with the Department of State for the conclusion of new agreements for
cooperation (under id. § 2153) and subsequent arrangements (under id. § 2160). The DOE
may also export small amounts of material without an export license (under id. § § 2074,
2094).
90. This contact with the executive branch was not statutorily required. See note 60
supra. In theory, the NRC could have issued a license even if the executive branch would
have denied it.
91. See note 89 supra.
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but it cannot approve a license without executive branch concurrence.12 The entire review process is formalized-timetables are established, and certain agencies are statutorily required to be consulted.13 The Act also affects the internal NRC decisionmaking process. The number of findings the NRC must make are multiplied
due to the establishment of specific criteria against which applications must be measured." If the NRC is unable to reach a decision
or if it denies the application, the President may nonetheless direct
it to issue a license." In such cases, as well as when the NRC approves an application involving a Presidential waiver, Congress may
overturn the decision by passing a concurrent resolution within sixty
days."
C. InternationalReaction
Not surprisingly, the immediate foreign reaction to the United
States initiative ran the gamut from calm opposition to outrage.
The precise reasons for this antagonism varied from nation to nation, and in many instances it resembled the hue and cry associated
with the raising of any new idea. Nevertheless, other nations legitimately felt that they were being asked to sacrifice a vital energy
source because of the notions of a new American President whom
they barely knew and whose wisdom they had no particular reason
to trust. In reality, this reaction was the culmination of a growing
concern with the United States as a reliable supplier. Foreign confidence in the willingness of the United States to make equipment,
fuel, and technology available on a long-term basis at an attractive
price and in a timely manner had already eroded by 1977. This lack
of confidence was due in part to the perception that United States
statutory procedures for the conclusion of new and amended agreements were too cumbersome, that its nuclear policy was not sufficiently stable, and that it was inordinately slow in granting specific
export licenses." Whether these perceptions were accurate or not,
92. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2155(a)(1) (West Supp. I 1978).
93. Id. §2155(a)(1), (b)(2). In theory, the executive branch must give the NRC its views
within 60 days, and the NRC must reach its decision within 120 days thereafter. These
timetables are not binding, however, and are seldom met. The Act also imposes strict requirements regarding the agencies that must be consulted.
94. Compare id. § 2156 (which is similar to the provisions that must be included in new
agreements for cooperation) with id. H§ 2074, 2077(b), 2094, 2153, 2160 (broad common
defense and security findings). It should be noted that the latter remains a separate finding
despite the criteria found in § 2156.
95. Id. § 2155(b)(2).
96. Id.
97. These problems in some respects were inherent. Even before the OPEC oil embargo
in 1973, nations were expressing concern about committing substantial investments and a
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cooperation with the United States, even before the advent of the
Carter Administration, no longer seemed so attractive. The actions
of that administration only exacerbated these problems.
Whatever the precise reasons for this opposition, the underlying
sense was one of betrayal. Other nations had made major investments in the development of nuclear energy based on the assurances, and indeed the encouragement, of the United States." Now
the United States was attempting to change the ground rules. While
the American hegemony over reactor sales was broken by the early
part of this decade, the United States remained the major supplier
of enrichment services and continued to be a significant force in the
reactor market." This situation gave the United States a considerable degree of control over foreign nuclear programs, and many
countries felt that the United States was taking unfair advantage
of this leverage in contravention of supply obligations imposed by
the current legal regime.
Although the United States has attempted to implement its
major segment of their electrical generating capacity to dependence on a single outside source
of energy. In other ways, however, these problems were self-induced. Foreign customers felt
that the announcement of the long-term fixed commitment contracts in 1973 placed excessive
demands and restraints upon their nuclear programs. The United States decision to stop
accepting new contracts for enrichment services and related problems associated with this
decision increased these doubts. See text accompanying note 114 infra.
These problems were exacerbated in 1975 when the delays in the issuance of licenses
began to occur due to the NRC's expansion of its review process. See text accompanying notes
58-59 supra; Weiss, supra note 58. Consequently, expensive plant delays resulted and foreign
customers felt that they were blackmailed into agreeing to new constraints. Due to this
situation the United States' reputation as a reliable supplier was put deeply in doubt. See
generally, Letter from J. L. Sanchez to Senator J. Sparkman (February 1, 1978), reprinted
in 124 CONG. REc. 1461 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Sanchez Letter]. Mr.
Sanchez is Administration General Manager, Contraies Nucleares del Norte (Spain).
98. It was originally assumed that reprocessing and recycling would continue, and
economic projections of nuclear power costs routinely included credits for plutonium and
recovered uranium. The United States strongly supported the domestic development of reprocessing and breeders at least through 1975. See Energy Research & Dev. Ad., Nuclear Fuel
Cycle (Mar. 1975) (ERDA-33). Nor did the United States disapprove of similar programs
abroad. From 1961 to 1974, approximately 575 transfers of United States-supplied nuclear
material were made between foreign countries. General Accounting Office, Assessment of
U.S. and International Controls Over the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (Sept. 14, 1976).
These requests involved retransfers for reprocessing by countries that desired the produced
plutonium for research and testing in advance reactor concepts. FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT, supra note 23, at 9-24.
99. As noted above, the United States supplied 91% of the reactors sold in the noncommunist world through 1972. Since that time the United States has sold less than 50%. In 1978,
only two of the projected 29 reactor orders (in seven countries) were anticipated to go to
United States firms. AIF International Survey, supra note 29, at 2.
Up to this time the United States has supplied almost all the enrichment services for
the uranium used as fuel in reactors. This monopoly is likely to be broken within the next
year, however, when new facilities become operational in France and the Netherlands.
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current nuclear programs within the existing legal framework, other
nations believe that this posture is a ruse and that the United States
is attempting to renege on its commitments under existing bilateral
agreements and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 00 These agreements,
of course, are a straightforward bargain-the United States agrees
to supply equipment, materials, and technology in exchange for a
certain level of nuclear safeguards. During the past several years,
however, the United States has indicated that it will not meet these
obligations unless its existing and prospective trading partners
accept added conditions,o'0 which theoretically permit the. United
States to shape other countries' domestic nuclear programs. This
perception has discouraged most nations from accepting the American position.
Thus, non-nuclear-weapons states that are parties to the NonProliferation Treaty almost uniformly have vociferously opposed the
American stance. The reaction of West Germany has not been atypical. Since the passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, West
Germany has received light water reactor technology and a great
majority of its fuel supply from the United States. As early as 1954,
it renounced its right to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. 02 In
1956 West Germany became one of the founding members of Euratom, accepting the safeguards imposed by that agreement as well
as the organization's cooperative agreement with the United
States.'03 Although there was never any question that West Germany would seek nuclear weapons, it hesitated prior to signing the
100. Consider the following observation by the Honorable Mr. Justice Parker:
Since the production of plutonium by reprocessing and its use in fast breeders was at
the time of the [Non-Proliferation] Treaty the accepted future, I find it difficult to see
how it can be argued that any party, whether a nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon
party, has not the right (a) to develop and use reprocessing for the production of plutonium (b) to develop and use the fast breeder (c) to have access to the technology and
equipment for creating reprocessing facilities and (d) to have access to reprocessing
facilities which may exist in the territory of another party and to the plutonium produced by the use of such facilities. I also find it difficult to see how a party, which has
developed reprocessing technology or created reprocessing facilities, would be otherwise
than in breach of the agreement, if it both refused to supply the technology to another
party and refused to reprocess for it.
1 Parker, The Windscale Inquiry 18 (Jan. 26, 1978) (report presented to Great Britain's
Secretary of State for the Environment).
101. The legality of the United States action under international law is questionable.
It is an established principle that treaties cannot be modified unilaterally by one party
without the consent of the other. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for
signature May 23, 1969, art. 39, reprinted in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALs 679 (1969); Dixit,
Amendment or Modification of Treaties, 10 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 37 (1970).
102. H. HAFrENDORN, supra note 43, at 11.
103. Id. See Agreement for Cooperation with the European Atomic Energy Community
Concerning Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Nov. 8, 1958, 10 U.S.T. 75, T.I.A.S. No. 4173.
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Treaty because of the second-class status membership would entail
vis-d-vis its Euratom partners who were nuclear-weapons states.
Nevertheless, it ratified the Treaty in 1969, emphasizing its understanding that nothing in the Treaty restricted research, development, and commercial uses of nuclear energy. 04
During the past twenty-five years, West Germany has formulated a comprehensive nuclear program designed to reduce its dependence on foreign sources that now provide fifty-six percent of the
country's energy requirements.'o This program has included a reprocessing capability for three purposes-plutonium recycling, fuel
for the breeder, and waste management. Uncertain of the extent of
natural uranium resources and suspicious of the reliability of their
owners to supply them, West Germany has vigorously pursued reprocessing for the first two reasons. It thought that plutonium recycling could lead to a reduction in the requirement of uranium of
approximately twenty percent annually and a reduction in the requirement for enrichment services of fifteen percent."' It also believed that breeders could extract at least sixty times more energy
from natural or depleted uranium than could thermal reactors.'"' In
recent years the waste management purpose has received increasing
emphasis, since West Germany has had a political and legal need
to resolve this problem before proceeding with any significant additions to its nuclear generating capacity. It should be noted that the
United States supported the West German reprocessing program
until recently.
The change in American policy has been extremely unsettling
to the West German plans. West Germany is one of many nations
that believe reprocessing is necessary for waste management purposes.s' For the immediate future, West German utilities have con104. H. HAFTENDORN, supra note 43, at 11.
105. This is an Organization of European Cooperation and Development (OECD) figure
for the period of 1974-1976, cited by G. Greenhalgh, European Reactions to the U.S. Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Policy 2 (January 16, 1978) (report prepared for the Congressional Research
Service of the Library of Congress) [hereinafter cited as Greenhalgh]. These OECD figures
show indigenous production is less than 30% for Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Finland,
France, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.
106. Communication from the Commission of the European Communities to the Council, Points for a Community Strategy on the Reprocessing of Irradiated Nuclear Fuels, at 3
(Com (77) 331 (final)) (1977).
107. Communication from the Commission of the European Communities to the Council, The Fast Breeder Option in the Community Context-Justification, Achievements, Problems and Action Perspectives, at 7 (Com (77) 331 (final)) (1977) [hereinafter cited as
EEC-Breeder]. The Commission noted that "to give an idea of what this represents, it can
be stated that 5000 tons of Uranium could produce, with the help of breeder reactors, the
energy associated with the estimated technically recoverable North Sea oil reserves." Id.
108. This also has been the conventional wisdom in the United States on the theory
that reprocessing simplifies disposal by reducing volume. But see IRG Report, supra note 66.
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cluded reprocessing contracts for about 1700 metric tons of spent
fuel with Cogema in France. Concurrently, West Germany has been
planning a five billion dollar fuel cycle center-including a reprocessing plant, a waste repository, an intermediate storage facility,
and a mixed oxide refabrication plant-at Gorleben in lower Saxony. As previously mentioned, however, the Non-Proliferation Act
requires United States approval prior to the reprocessing of United
States-origin material or spent fuel that has been irradiated in a
United States reactor. This gives the United States a virtual veto
over the operation of the Gorleben reprocessing facilities as well as
the reprocessing at Cogema, since almost all spent fuel accumulated
to this time has originated from the United States. This uncertainty
is complicated by the vagaries of the United States review process
that operates on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis without a detailed
statutory standard. Moreover, this review process involves five
agencies, the possible preparation of a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
several different approval scenarios, and final congressional review. 09
Many nations have contended that while the United States
requires immediate acceptance of additional safeguards, it is unwilling to assure that even if these conditions are accepted the
United States will provide the necessary supplies in a timely manner. While the Non-Proliferation Act commits the United States to
be a reliable supplier, these provisions are primarily hortatory. Past
history gives little assurance that a nation accepting the additional
conditions mandated by the Act will receive the assured supply of
nuclear fuel. Indeed, many nations perceive that the procedural and
substantive complexities of the Act and the resulting ambiguities
create numerous opportunities for mischief that could delay or even
block the issuance of necessary export approvals." 0
Although the first, albeit temporary, cutoff of fuel under the
Non-Proliferation Act was to Euratom-the nuclear arm of the European communityI '-developing nations, irrespective of Treaty
109. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2160 (West Supp. I 1978).
110. See Sanchez Letter, supra note 97.
111. The Euratom cutoff arose because of Euratom's unwillingness to agree to renegotiation of its agreement for cooperation with the United States within 60 days of the enactment of the Non-Proliferation Act. Section 304 of that Act (42 U.S.C.A. § 2155 (West Supp.
I 1978)) waives for 24 months the immediately effective requirements of § 2156 that all
recipients must agree to United States controls over retransfers and reprocessing provided
that the recipient's agreement currently lacks such provisions and the recipient agrees to
renegotiate its agreement within 60 days. Euratom took the position that the Act unilaterally
abrogated the existing agreement that did not expire until 1995. Energy Daily, April 13, 1978,
at 3. The impasse was broken when the Carter Administration accepted a Euratom proposal
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membership, have been particularly strident in their opposition to
the Act. Yugoslavia, a Non-Proliferation Treaty member, has led
the Third World position, questioning the commitment of the
United States to fulfill its obligations under the Treaty. The Yugoslav opposition is understandable, since it has encountered significant delays in obtaining export licenses from the NRC, even though
its purchase of an American reactor was deemed a significant breakthrough in United States-Eastern European relations. This opposition has manifested itself both in a threat to withdraw from the
Treaty because the United States and Soviet Union have not fulfilled their pledge to cooperate under Article IV and in a proposal
to convene an international conference on the political aspects of
nuclear-related technology transfer."I2
Developing nations that are not members of the NonProliferation Treaty have centered their criticism on similar
grounds and, more importantly, have used the present developments to justify the continuation of their own national programs."3
These nations feel that they have neither the time nor the funds to
wait for the commercial development of alternative technologies
and resent the degree of discrimination inherent in the United
States approach with its emphasis on restraint. As has been true
with the whole spectrum of international issues-whetlier nonproliferation, law of the seas, pollution, or trade-the policies of the
developing nations on nuclear matters have been designed to provide maximum flexibility for national action. They perceive nuclear
development as an attractive method to develop a secure energy
supply for long-term industrial growth and to reduce their political
and economic dependence on outside powers. Since few developing
countries have domestic uranium resources, they view the establishment of a reprocessing capability as a necessary means to stretch
fuel supplies. In turn, they regard any attempt to limit their acquisition of this capability as yet another example of the developed nations' desire to perpetuate the dependency of the Third World. Consequently, there has been little movement among developing nato discuss the renegotiation of the agreement for cooperation, with discussions limited to
subjects not under consideration in the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation.
NucLEONIcs WEEK, July 13, 1978, at 8.
112. See generally Address by Sigvard Eklund, International Conference on Nuclear
Non-Proliferation and Safeguards, in New York City (Oct. 24, 1978) (sponsored by the Atomic
Industrial Forum).
113. See generally Address by David Fischer, International Conference on Regulating
Nuclear Energy, in Brussels (May 18, 1978) (sponsored by the Atomic Industrial Forum),
quoted in NUCLEAR INDUSTRY, June 1978, at 5 (Mr. Fischer is Assistant Director General for
External Relations at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna.).
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tions to sign the Treaty in recent years. For most of these nations,
it is not that nonproliferation is unimportant, but rather that other
concerns are more urgent.
Brazil provides an excellent example.'" During the last decade
Brazil has designed its domestic and foreign policies to foster economic development above all other national objectives. This effort
has been extremely successful; the Brazilian gross national product
has doubled over the past ten years. A major constraint on this
development, however, has been Brazil's dependence on foreign
sources for eighty percent of its oil requirements, at a cost of $300
million a month. Brazil thus has regarded the development of nuclear power as an economic necessity and has sought to fulfill this
need through a package deal with West Germany. This agreement
involved equipment, materials, and technology relating to almost
the entire fuel cycle, including mining, enrichment, reactors, reprocessing, and fuel fabrication. It also contained the most stringent
safeguards ever required in an individual transaction. It should be
noted that this agreement was reached only after the United States,
whose firms originally had expected to sell the next group of reactors
to Brazil, shifted long-term fuel guarantees for these reactors to
"conditional" status and returned the deposit payment. Although
the American action occurred solely because it had contracted for
all its present capacity and had nothing to do with Brazil per se, the
threat of a fuel cutoff increased the incentives to Brazil for seeking
the broad range of assistance included in the West German deal.
Thus, it is not surprising that Brazil has not yielded to the recent
American initiative.
More disturbing, however, other non-Treaty developing nations
have used the American position to justify continuation of their
indigenous programs, which are not subject to international safeguards. Perhaps the foremost example of this is India, which has
several research reactors and an indigenously constructed
commercial-size reprocessing facility that are not safeguarded, and
is in the process of constructing an experimental breeder reactor." 5
Since its peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974, India has encountered
severe difficulties in obtaining low-enriched fuel from the United
States."6 Although this reluctance on the part of the United States
114. See generally H. HAFFENDORN, supra note 43; Fishlow, Flying Down to Rio:
Perspectives on US.-Brazil Relations, 57 FOREIGN AFF. 387 (1978).
115. See Washington Post, Dec. 5, 1977, § A, at 16, Col. 1.
116. See, e.g., 2 NUCLEAR REG. REP. (CCH) $ 30,288 (Apr. 24, 1978) (NRC fails in tie
vote to approve export license of fuel to India). This decision was reversed in an April 27,
1978, executive order by President Carter. Exec. Order No. 12,055, 43 Fed. Reg. 18,157 (1978).
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may be understandable, the international community in 1973 had
not yet equated "peaceful nuclear explosions" with a weapons capability. Furthermore, India broke no safeguard agreements in conducting this explosion. Meanwhile, India has taken the position that
it does not feel obligated to honor its safeguard commitments if the
United States does not meet its supply obligations. This impasse
might lead to United States-supplied fuel being reprocessed in an
unsafeguarded facility, a situation the United States certainly
would not desire." 7 Although India began planning for the abovementioned facilities prior to 1974, the present difficulties undoubtedly have injected a sense of urgency into their completion.
While equally adverse to the spread of nuclear weapons, other
suppliers, including some of America's closest allies, have criticized
the United States approach as encouraging these indigenous efforts.
These nations note that no failure of international safeguards has
ever been known to occur, and they argue that suppliers should offer
incentives to other countries to join the present regime and to work
within the international community to improve this admittedly
imperfect framework."' They believe that the United States initiative is at best naive and at worst a guise to further American commercial interests.
These critics also contend the international community should
focus more upon reducing motivations toward the development of
an explosive capability. They regard the likelihood that a nation
would acquire the peaceful fuel cycle as a cover for weapons development as remote, given the billion dollar cost associated with the
reactor alone. The likelihood is further reduced since the plutonium
derived from reprocessed reactor fuel is of a lesser grade for weapons
purposes than that produced from a small plutonium production or
research reactor that could be built at less than one-tenth of that
By a vote of 181 to 227, the House failed to pass H.R. Res. 599, disapproving the proposed
export of low-enriched uranium to India. 124 CONG. REc. 6517-31 (daily ed. July 12, 1978);
see H.R. REP. No. 1314, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. (1978).
117. See, e.g., President Desai's remarks to the Indian Parliament on April 24, 1978:
For the time being, therefore, we have to wait for such action as the President may take
in order to clear our pending requisitions. I have already asked our Atomic Energy
Commission to examine every alternative avenue to keep up the supplies of fuel for the
Tarapur Plant in case the uncertainties of supplies from the United States becomes a
permanent feature. In coming to this decision, I have taken fully into account the
obligation of the United States to supply us with fuel and their refusal being a breach
of the agreement. I am conscious that any such refusal would bring to an end both the
agreement for cooperation and the contract. We cannot allow such an eventuality to
interfere with our programme for development of atomic energy . . . .
Donnelly & Kramer, Licensing Fuel for India's Tarapur Nuclear Powerplant 6-7 (Aug. 29,
1978) (prepared for Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress).
118. See generally Greenhalgh, supra note 105.
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cost."' The United States initiative, however, has focused primarily
on the peaceful fuel cycle and has ignored the other paths to weapons development. Furthermore, they argue that the United States
position and the uncertainties it entails have created additional
incentives for nations to construct reprocessing facilities. These facilities are within the capabilities of almost all moderately industrialized nations and are difficult to detect.120 Thus, they contend
that it is wiser and safer to ensure that reprocessing facilities are
developed under careful international control and scrutiny rather
than to attempt to stop them altogether, an effort they feel is
doomed to certain failure.
The naivety perceived in this policy has led some nations to
argue that the United States, precluded from expanding its own
nuclear developing reprocessing and breeders because of domestic
political concerns, is really seeking to forestall the development of
international programs. The West Germans, for instance, stress that
their domestic nuclear program, heavily dependent on export orders, is being severely curtailed. Other nations have argued that the
United States still has access to reprocessing through its military
program, for which there is no accountability, and that the United
States position on reprocessing is driving up prices on the uranium
market, where the United States is a major supplier.12 1 Undoubtedly
this perception occurs most frequently with regard to the breeder.
France and the Soviet Union both are clearly ahead of the United
States in breeder development with the United Kingdom about
even and West Germany and Japan not far behind.122
Even without the perception that the United States position is
a guise for commercial considerations, these nations contend that
the breeder is necessary because they do not have the domestic fuel
reserves that the United States has and/or that the United States
by foregoing plutonium fuels, will compete and consume an even
119. See J. Lamarsh, On The Construction Of Plutonium-Producing Reactors by Small
and/or Developing Nation (1976) (report prepared for the Congressional Research Service of
the Library of Congress), reprintedin Export ReorganizationAct of 1976: Hearingson S. 1439
Before the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1326 (1976).
120. See General Accounting Office, Quick and Secret Construction of Plutonium Reprocessing Plants: A Way to Nuclear Weapons Proliferation? (Oct. 6, 1978); Atlantic Council,
Nuclear Power and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation 80-81, 88 (June 19, 1978) [hereinafter
cited as Atlantic Council].
121. See Rippon, Comment from Europe:InternationalAgreements Will Never Be the
Same Again, NucLEAR NEWs, May 1978, at 60.
122. The Soviet Union, for instance, has 12 MWe and 150 MWe breeder reactors already
in operation, and breeders of 600 MWe and 1600 MWe under construction. AIF International
Survey, supra note 29, at 3. By contrast, the proposed United States facility at Clinch River,
the construction of which the Carter Administration opposes, would produce 375 MWe.

1979]1

NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT

871

greater share of the world's uranium and oil.' ' The delay in development sought by the United States would seriously affect ongoing
programs and underestimates the long lead-time necessary to deploy the breeder. Almost all nations doubt a decision on the commercialization of the breeder is possible during the next ten years
even with no delays in the program. An indefinite deferral, however,
would mean a partial dismantling of the governmental research
centers, industrial companies, and the complex web of commercial
relationships that could not be easily reassembled later. It also
would delay the development of reprocessing facilities necessary for
breeder deployment. Consequently, these nations argue that adoption of the United States' policy would cause them to lose their
existing investment, and cause their research and development efforts to atrophy.'
Consequently, the United States initiative has had little direct
effect on present foreign nuclear projects. No national enrichment,
reprocessing, or breeder program outside the United States has been
deferred in the past two years, although plans in some nations that
did not have ongoing projects may have been reassessed. The British
Parliament has authorized the construction of a new reprocessing
facility at Windscale that is heavily dependent for financing on a
contract the British signed last year to reprocess 1600 metric tons
of Japanese spent fuel. Similarly, the French have concluded contracts with Japan, West Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, Belgium,
Holland, and Austria to reprocess about 6000 tons of spent fuel since
the announcement of the Carter policy.

IV. 1977-1979:

THE UNITED STATES COUNTERREACTION

In reality United States nuclear policy and the administration
of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act have neither been as harsh as
critics portray nor as responsive as the United States contends.
From the beginning the United States initiative has suffered from
characterization as a policy of "denial" both by nuclear critics
within and outside the United States and by the domestic nuclear
industry, all of whom have regarded the Carter Administration as
antinuclear.1rs The United States policy also has been plagued by a
number of unfortunate statements by the Administration, including
123. EEC-Breeder, supra note 107. See generally Rockefeller Foundation, International Cooperation on Breeder Reactors 4-2 to 10, 4-16 to 18 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Rockefeller Foundation].
124. EEC-Breeder, supra note 107; Greenhalgh, supra note 105, at 8-9; Rockefeller
Foundation, supra note 123.
125. See EEC-Breeder, supra note 107; Greenhalgh, supra note 105; Rockefeller Foundation, supra note 123.
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several from the President himself.126 Of equal damage was the early
"gangbuster's" approach the Administration took in sending VicePresident Mondale to Europe and South America in an attempt to
stop the West German-Brazilian arrangement.' Together these
matters hardened the foreign reaction before any real understanding
of the United States position could occur.
Since the inception of this policy, the Administration has
stressed the need for international cooperation in resolving the nonproliferation problem. In his press conference of April 7, 1977, President Carter noted that "The United States is deeply concerned
about the consequences of the uncontrolled spread of this nuclear
weapon capability. We can't arrest it immediately and unilaterally.
We have no authority over other countries . . . ."' He elaborated

on the elements of this policy in response to a question later in the
press conference:
It would be impossible, counterproductive and ill-advised for us to try to
prevent other countries that need it from having the capability to produce
electricity from atomic power .

. .

. The one difference that has been very

sensitive, it relates to, say, Germany, Japan and others is that they feel that
our unilateral action in renouncing the reprocessing of spent fuels to produce
plutonium might imply that we criticize them severely because of their own
need for reprocessing. This is not the case. They have a perfect right to go
ahead and continue with their own reprocessing efforts. But we hope that they
will join with us in eliminating in the future additional countries which might
have had this capability evolve.'"

The Administration has repeated these sentiments in the communiques following the 1977 London and 1978 Bonn economic summits.,"0
126. In his formal statement accompanying the March 10, 1978 signing of the Non-

Proliferation Act, President Carter in a conciliatory manner called upon the international
community to work together to prevent proliferation. 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 500

(Mar. 13, 1978). President Carter's remarks at the bill signing ceremony, however, had a
different tone:
This is one of the most complicated questions that presents itself to the international community. I think it is accurate to say that some of our friends abroad will have
to readjust their policy.
I've discussed them thoroughly with the heads of state who have been here to visit
with me and whom I've gotten to know. And I think they will see the wisdom of the action
that the Senate and the House have taken in this legislation.
Id. at 498.
127. See H. HAFrENDORN, supra note 43.
128. 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PREs. Doc. 501, 503 (Apr. 11, 1977).
129. Id. at 505.
130. For example, the July 17, 1978 communique following the Bonn summit where it
was agreed that:
The further development of nuclear energy is indispensable, and the slippage in the
execution of nuclear power programmes must be reversed. To promote the peaceful use
of nuclear energy and reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation, the nuclear fuel cycle
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The Administration has manifested its attitude in various
ways. It successfully opposed many of the more restrictive provisions in the early versions of the Non-Proliferation Act that would
have cut off nuclear trade with many of the United States close
allies. It also successfully supported provisions in the Act that clarify previously uncertain criteria,"' give the President authority to
override any negative decision by the NRC,132 and establish ground
rules governing public participation in the nuclear process.'*' Furthermore, it implemented the Act in a manner fairly responsive to
the concerns of United States trading partners. For the most part,
export licenses for nuclear fuel and equipment have been forthcoming with a minimum of difficulty."'
The United States policy, however, has suffered from a duality
of nature. Despite the efforts at cooperation, the United States has
not been totally responsive to the legitimate concerns of its trading
partners. Although the President's remarks indicated that other
nations could proceed with their plutonium-related programs if they
desire, it was clear that the Administration hoped to dissuade other
nations from these efforts. The United States also placed heavy
emphasis upon alternative fuel cycles, as though there were some
magical formula that would ameliorate all the nonproliferation concerns that led to the United States initiative.
Moreover, the implementation of the Carter policy and NonProliferation Act has not been as smooth as the international community would have desired. The inherent uncertainties in the Act's
provisions concerning United States approval of export licenses and
reprocessing requests have already been mentioned. Similarly, the
United States has not been meeting the Act's time limits for consideration of export applications in the substantial majority of cases.
Although the Act expressly states that its provisions do not prohibit
studies initiated at the London Summit should be pursued. The President of the United
States and the Prime Minister of Canada have expressed their firm intention to continue
as reliable suppliers of nuclear fuel within the framework of effective safeguards. The
President intends to use the full powers of his office to prevent any interruption of
enriched uranium supply and to ensure that existing agreements will be respected. The
Prime Minister intends that there shall be no interruption of Canadian uranium supply
on the basis of effective safeguards.
14 WEEKLY COMP. oF PREs. Doc. 1310, 1312 (Jul. 24, 1978).
131. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2156-2157 (West Supp. I 1978). The wisdom of the precise details
of this clarification is questionable.
132. The Tarapur nuclear power plant case is an excellent example of the flexibility the
Act provides in this regard. See note 117 supra and accompanying text.
133. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2155 (West Supp. I 1978).
134. See 43 Fed. Reg. 25,326 (1978) (executive branch procedures); NRC export-import
regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 21,641 (1978) (to be codified in 10 C.F.R. Pt. 110) (NRC exportimport regulations).
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the foreign reprocessing of United States-supplied fuel, the Administration has granted such requests grudgingly, demanding additional consideration in the two cases thus far approved.15 Additionally, the United States has slowly implemented its proposal to store
foreign-generated spent fuel. For many nations this is the one clear
alternative to reprocessing for waste management purposes.' 6 The
United States also has been tardy in announcing the details of its
plan to contribute to the development of international institutional
arrangements to insure vulnerable countries against interruptions in
fuel supplies, despite the President's announcement of this policy
in October 1977.m31 Finally, the United States may have further complicated the export process by requiring environmental assessment
of certain nuclear exports.138
This performance, albeit mixed, has been accompanied by a
willingness to compromise in certain key areas, thereby revealing a
subtle yet dramatic change in the American position. This was
made apparent in a speech by Joseph Nye before the Uranium
Institute in London on July 12, 1978.13" After reiterating the usual
arguments supporting the Administration's policy, Nye noted that
the Administration had not opposed foreign breeder research and
development programs and presented what in effect would be a code
of conduct governing such activities:
We ask those who choose to go ahead now with the breeder to include the
following factors in their decisionmaking process.
* Avoidance of the temptation to reduce per unit capital costs by premature exports-the commercialization of the breeder (and reprocessing) should
be limited to situations where it has compelling advantages. Economies of
scale arguments dictate that only the largest nuclear programs could satisfy
such a condition for commercialization.
* Fuel cycle facilities should be designed to make their misuse difficult
and time consuming, even though such design, as in the case of hot fuel
fabrication, may involve additional cost.
135. See Hearings on Nuclear Fuel Transfer for Reprocessing Before the Sub comm. on
InternationalEconomic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on International Relations,
95th Cong. 2d Sess. 48 (1978) (testimony of J. Nye).
136. The draft environmental statement was not published until December 1978, and
thus it is extremely unlikely that the Department of Energy will meet its original goal of
accepting foreign spent fuel by 1982-1983. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, DArr ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPAcT STATEMENT, STORAGE OF FOREIGN SPENT POWER REACTOR FUEL (DOE/EIS-004-D, December 1978).
137. Although § 104 of the Non-Proliferation Act (22 U.S.C.A. § 3223 (West Supp. I
1978)) required a report to Congress by September 10, 1978, no report had been submitted
as of January 1, 1979.
138. Statement by the President, Sept. 26, 1978, reprintedin 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES.
Doc. 1631, 1634 (Oct. 2, 1978).
139. Address by J. Nye, Uranium Institute, in London (July 12, 1978), reprinted in
DEP'T STATE BULL., Oct. 1978, at 38. [hereinafter cited as Nye].
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* Efforts should be made to minimize flows of cold plutonium or fuels with
high concentrations of fissionable materials even if this adds to transport costs.
* Multinational institutional arrangements should be utilized where there
are compelling reasons to proceed with new technology. While such arrangements could produce benefits in economic efficiency, such steps would be
desirable even if they led to a net cost.'"

Nye went on to review the United States position regarding the
elements of a stable international regime. These were (1) full-scope
(Treaty-type) safeguards; (2) avoidance of sensitive facilities unless
they can be shown to be economically justifiable; (3) use of diversion
resistant technology; (4) joint control of sensitive facilities; and (5)
institutions to insure the availability of the benefits of nuclear en-

ergy.141
While the rhetoric has changed only slightly, this speech is
indicative of significant adjustments in United States nuclear policy. The emphasis has shifted from attempting to live without plutonium to attempting to contain it. The United States has begun
stressing that its policy regarding the breeder and reprocessing is
meant as a short-term pause, lasting only until the international
community can achieve an effective framework governing the use of
plutonium, rather than an indefinite deferral designed to lead to
cancellation of such programs. It acknowledges that some countries
will proceed with their reprocessing and breeder programs and that
the United States is willing to find such programs acceptable under
certain circumstances. Finally, the United States has begun emphasizing institutional rather than technical approaches, no longer
stressing the nonproliferation advantages of alternative fuel cycles.
V. 1978-1979: A MOVEMENT TOWARD RECONCILIATION
These modifications of the United States position and the increasing foreign familiarity with the real United States position
have softened the international reaction somewhat. Nonproliferation increasingly is being recognized as an important objective of the
international community, and other nations are more willing to discuss methods to add barriers to the diversion of nuclear materials.
These nations also are undertaking a general reanalysis of long-held
assumptions and are reconsidering previously rejected alternatives.
Additionally, they have begun working with the United States to
strengthen the IAEA safeguard regime, to find institutional arrangements to complement the safeguard system, and to reach a consensus on common safeguard policies.14
140. Id. at 41.
141. Id. at 42.

142. France and West Germany both have announced that they will suspend exporting
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One of the primary catalysts leading to these compromises and
the forum whereby a new consensus may begin to emerge has been
the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE). As noted
earlier, INFCE was originally proposed in President Carter's April
7, 1977, policy statement on nuclear power. The proposal was agreed
to at the London Economic Summit a month later. INFCE is intended to be an objective and comprehensive analysis of the nonproliferation, economic, and political implications of alternative fuel
cycle options.'4 3 This study, which is expected to be completed in
early 1980, provides a method by which nations can reexamine assumptions and search for ways to reconcile their somewhat different
assumptions regarding the risks involved in, and the commercialization of, reprocessing and the breeder. The broad range of factors
being considered in INFCE-availability of fuel, availability of enrichment services, supply assurances, reprocessing and plutonium
handling, breeder reactors, spent fuel management, waste management, and advanced fuel cycle and reactor concepts-is emblematic
of the complex nature of the nonproliferation issue.' 4
While INFCE is primarily a technical exercise and not a negotiating mechanism designed to establish new international structures, the broad participation in this effort-over forty nations and
four international organizations'"-is a step indicative of a spirit of
compromise and adjustment that in itself is an essential element of
any legal process. Indeed, as the study proceeds, the participants
are becoming more pragmatic and realistic, overcoming their initial
aggravation with, and suspicion of, the United States position.
Moreover, the United States attempts to steer the study towards
particular conclusions, such as support for the once-through fuel
cycle, have been rebuffed, and the conflict between developed and
developing nations has for the most part remained mute. Consequently, it now appears that INFCE will seriously examine the
range of options, including institutional matters, that must be considered by the participating nations.
Although it would be premature to speculate on the outcome
of INFCE at this time, undoubtedly the evaluation will aid efforts
to reach a new consensus. Besides establishing a spirit of cooperareprocessing plants. Washington Post, Dec. 17, 1976, § A, at 34, col. 1; id., Dec. 21, 1976, §
A, at 1, col. 3.
143. See generally Address by E. Hanrahan, International Conference on Nuclear NonProliferation and Safeguards, in New York (October 23, 1978) (sponsored by the Atomic
Industrial Forum) (remarks on INFCE's contribution to nonproliferation objectives).
144. Id.
145. This includes consumers and suppliers, developing and developed countries,
eleven nations that have not even joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

1979]1

NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT

877

tion, INFCE has given experts from many nations an opportunity
for a full and frank exchange of ideas. Equally important, INFCE
may provide a common factual and analytical basis for the use of
decisionmakers from all countries in dealing with nuclear energy
issues."'
VI. 1980 AND BEYOND: A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW CONSENSUS
The process embodied in INFCE already has led to an emerging
consensus on the outlines of a new nonproliferation regime. This
approach would build upon the foundations of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty and IAEA statute and would focus primarily upon limiting
national access to plutonium and other potential weapons material.
Additionally, it would require the strengthening of the technical
effectiveness of safeguards, the utilization of nondiscriminatory limitations on the transfer of sensitive nuclear technologies, the adoption of fuel assurance programs for nations accepting expansive nonproliferation measures, the formation of multinational institutions
to undertake certain sensitive activities in the fuel cycle, the establishment of an international regime for the storage and management
of excess plutonium under the IAEA statute, and the creation of
sanctions for erring nations. Finally, several nations (but it should
be emphasized not all) have begun deemphasizing the need to take
into account widescale reprocessing for the sake of plutonium recycling, since they believe its economic benefits are marginal at
best."
146. The participants in INFCE have specifically stated:
The participants agreed that INFCE was to be a technical and analytical study and not
a negotiation. The results will be transmitted to governments for their consideration in
developing their nuclear energy policies and in international discussions concerning
nuclear energy cooperation and related controls and safeguards. Participants would not
be committed to INFCE's results.
Final Communique of the Organizing Conference of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Evaluation, Doc. 41 (Oct. 21, 1977).
147. Joseph Nye's address before the Uranium Institute (see text accompanying notes
139-41 supra) contrasts with the following remarks of the West German delegate at the IAEA
general conference:
It appears to be desirable and also possible to identify a bouquet of coordinated measures
which at the end of the evaluations might be submitted-with a high degree of consensus-to the governments for their decision. Without prejudging the further development,
one might expect to find among these measures some of the following items:
-further technical development of safeguards
-increasing reliability of fuel supply for nuclear power stations
-criteria for the use of highly enriched uranium in research and new reactor
types
-closer investigation of possible modifications in some current back-end of fuel
cycle technologies
-establishment of a regime for the deposit of excess plutonium as provided in
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Although the remaining differences are substantial and still
threaten to undermine the existing regime, all nations have powerful incentives to resolve these disputes. Containing proliferation is
in almost everyone's self-interest. For a nation to develop a nuclear
explosive is almost a pyrrhic victory,' since that nation's neighbor
will soon follow a similar path. It is notable that safeguards, once
imposed as a matter of property rights, are increasingly being looked
upon as a nation's international obligation. Furthermore, just as
was true in the mid-1950's, the future of worldwide nuclear development depends, to a significant degree, on a reduction in the perceived and real risks of the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Today, however, nations have a much greater need for the benefits
of nuclear energy, and this is likely to motivate them to place a
stronger emphasis upon reaching a new consensus. Almost everyone
agrees that any new consensus should fit within the existing legal
framework, but whether the foundations of the present regime can
continue to withstand the stress under which they currently exist is
extremely questionable.' It has been dangerous to delay this long;
to delay further could thwart attaining mutually desirable objectives.
the IAEA statute
-mechanisms for international or regional institutional cooperation.
Quoted in Address by J. Nye, U.S. and F.R.G. Policies in the Nuclear Industry Field: Common and Divergent Interests, German-American Forum, Georgetown University (Nov. 2,
1978) (remarks prepared for the German-American Forum). See also Energy Daily, Dec. 12,
1978, at 3.
148. Except, of course, for the so-called "pariah state" whose neighbors question its
legitimacy.
149. The next year or so will be particularly crucial for the international community.
INFCE should be completed and the London Suppliers Conference is expected to meet again.
Arrangements for international plutonium storage will be the subject of further study as will
international spent fuel repositories. Moreover, the international fuel bank idea will be explored in greater detail.
The United States also must make a number of complex decisions in the next few years.
These include decisions about the basis on which approvals for reprocessing will be made,
the basis on which the reprocessing plant at Tokai Mura will be allowed to continue operating, the possible cutoff of exports to India and other countries that have not accepted the
Non-Proliferation Act's full-scope safeguards and the decision to continue nuclear exports to
EURATOM at the end of the two-year period provided in the Act for renegotiation of the
agreement for cooperation. Further discussions regarding cooperation between the United
States and France over enrichment facilities also will be held. In addition, there are the
fundamental questions concerning the continued indefinite deferral of reprocessing, the commercialization of breeder technology, and the development of a policy regarding the return
of plutonium to countries whose requests for reprocessing have been approved by the United
States.
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A. The Proposed Approach
While the United States nuclear policy initiative has raised
legitimate concerns that need to be addressed, the current American
approach continues to ignore several obvious facts. First, the risks
of nuclear weapons proliferation cannot be reduced to zero since the
knowledge, technical capacity, and basic materials for making nuclear explosives are now widespread in the world. These risks will
not decrease in the future. No amount of international policing
consistent with present concepts of national sovereignty-let alone
the acute sensitivity of many nations today-can prevent nations
from developing nuclear explosives. Europe, India, and most likely
Japan will continue their work on reprocessing as well as the
breeder, and it is likely that other nations will follow their lead.
Second, the United States position also ignores the fact that other
nations will not respond lightly to foreign fiats. While nations will
give up some sovereignty for a larger self-interest, they generally will
seek to retain maximum authority over domestic decisionmaking
and will not consider another nation's decision on the economics of
a particular matter as binding. Third, the United States approach
downplays the irrefutable notion that suppliers as well as recipients
have obligations under the current legal regime, and that these
obligations are not fulfilled by vague promises to be a reliable supplier. Finally, the United States policy focuses too much on acceptance by developed nations rather than by the Third World, in whose
states the greatest future nuclear expansion probably will occur,
thus posing the greatest threat to any efforts to contain proliferation.5 0
These deficiencies need not be fatal to the reaching of a new
consensus, and if modified accordingly, they could be the basis of a
much stronger regime than the one that presently exists. In general,
the United States initiative does propose the correct mechanism,
calling for a code of conduct to govern plutonium-related activities
as a supplement to the current regime. As the ongoing negotiations
in the Law of the Sea Conference reveal by implication, the time is
not yet ripe, if it ever will be, for the emergence of a strong interna150. A recent study by the Conservation Commision of the World Energy Conference
found that projected nuclear installation in developing countries would increase from 1 GWe
(electrical gigawatts) in 1975 (or about 1%of total installed nuclear capacity) to 180 GWe in
2000 (12%) and to 925 GWe in 2020 (18-19%). The primary reason given was lack of indigenous
energy sources. CONSERVATION COMMITTEE OF THE WORLD ENERGY CONFERENCE, WORLD ENERGY:
LOOKING AHEAD To 2020, 92-97 (1978); see AIF International Survey, supra note 29. See also
Benson, Science and Technology: Their Interactionwith ForeignPolicy, DEP'T STATE BULL.,
Oct. 1978, at 54-55.
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tional authority having jurisdiction over one or more aspects of the
fuel cycle."' Furthermore, it can fairly be said that the prospects for
a rapid agreement are an inverse function of the amount of change
necessary in the current regime to reach consensus.
The United States should propose a code of conduct governing
the actions of both recipients and suppliers. In furtherance of their
obligations under Article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, existing commercial reprocessors 5 2 should be called upon to guarantee
they will provide services on a timely basis and on attractive terms.
These suppliers should also pledge that they will make their technology available to multinational entities in accordance with the
provisions set forth below. Recipients, on the other hand, should
agree to abide by these provisions and accept comprehensive IAEA
safeguards on such transfers. While national reprocessing facilities
would not be prohibited under such a regime, they would be ineligible for foreign assistance. Since it is likely that nations, for one
reason or another, will choose to build national facilities, it may be
useful to permit certain types of plants, while offering these nations
inducements to join in the construction of multinational facilities.1 3
All facilities, whether national or multinational, located in nonnuclear-weapons states must meet certain conditions under this
proposal. The first requirement is that these facilities must be of
commercial size. The requirement of commercial size ensures that
the countries involved are serious about the use of the facility for
energy purposes and are not using it as a cover for the production
of weapons material.' Second, these facilities must be combined
with plutonium fuel fabrication facilities so that no plutonium, except for a few grams when necessary for research purposes,", ever
leaves the facility other than in fuel rods.' 6 JAEA safeguards would
151. See Darman, The Law of the Sea: Rethinking U.S. Interests, 56 FOREIGN AFr. 373
(1978).
152. Although the proposed regime is not oriented toward enrichment facilities, this
proposal could be readily adapted to this aspect of the fuel cycle. Since enrichment technology was not widespread in 1969, however, there is some question whether Article IV should
be read as granting access to this technology.
153. The existing Indian reprocessing facility could pose a substantial problem for such
a regime. It would not pose an insurmountable obstacle, however, if the United States were
willing to exempt it from the proposed regime on a preexisting-basis theory.
154. What constitutes a commercial-size facility is difficult to define. A number of
factors could be adopted for its definition, either individually or in combination, including
capacity, number of reactors served, or profitability.
155. The supplier of the fuel should exercise approval rights in this instance. Any such
research project should be specified, verifiable, and subject to IAEA safeguards.
156. This would negate the need for a detailed release mechanism for plutonium recovered from reprocessing, which has troubled decisionmakers in this area. See Nye, supra
note 139, at 42. It also would eliminate the potential risks involved with the transportation
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attach to all material leaving the site, no matter what its form. The
plutonium from the time it is separated during the enrichment process to the time it is fabricated into fuel rods would be considered
"excess" for the purposes of the IAEA statute' 7 and thus would
legally be under the custody of the IAEA. 5 1Finally, the reprocessing
state must agree to the permanent assignment of IAEA inspectors
and operational personnel to the site in numbers sufficient to guard
against diversion.
Facilities eligible for foreign assistance must be multinational
in nature and be "owned" by at least three states, with operation
and management control under at least two states party to the NonProliferation Treaty.' Representatives of states that have not ratified the Treaty will not be granted access to the technology.6 0 Any
facility constructed by a consortium must be located in a treaty
member state. The transferor of the technology would sit as an ex
officio member of the governing entity of the facility for safeguard
purposes. Any retransfer of the technology would require the transferor's assent and could be made only in accordance with the above
noted conditions. Finally, all reprocessing facilities built by a consortium within twenty years after the last technology transfer would
be conclusively presumed to have resulted from the transfer,
thereby triggering the provisions of this paragraph.
of plutonium in pure form.
157. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, supra note 8, art. XII(A)(5),
8 U.S.T. at 1106, 276 U.N.T.S. at 26.
158. While such a proposal would not make the plutonium totally immune from seizure
by the host government, it could prove to be a formidable psychological barrier. On December
4-6, 1978, the IAEA held the first in a series of meetings to discuss measures for placing
plutonium under international controls. Suggestions ranged from the development of a plutonium bank to the establishment of away-from-reactor spent fuel storage in the feed streams
of reprocessing plants. NucLEra FUEL, Dec. 11, 1978, at 7.
159. The definition of multinational is purposely left loose. Past proposals would, in
effect, create supernational mechanisms for this purpose. These break down into basically
four variants: (1) international cooperative with regional affiliates, (2) multinational fuel
cycle centers, (3) multinational enclaves, and (4) international fuel cycle authority. See
Atlantic Council, supra note 120, at 106-110. See also International Atomic Energy Agency,
Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Centres (1977). While there is a great deal of theoretical merit
to these proposals, they probably are unacceptable politically. It is better to permit loosely
knit multinational organizations that provide an additional barrier to national diversion than
to concentrate on such academically meritorious, yet unworkable, concepts.
It should be noted that multinational fuel cycle centers have precedents for both enrichment and reprocessing plants. Two enrichment facilities and several reprocessing plants have
been built in Western Europe by different public and private groups. Their primary motivation was economic, and the partners were mostly advanced countries not generally considered
prime proliferation threats. Nevertheless, these examples demonstrate that the concept is
feasible under certain conditions.
160. These countries, of course, would have no claim to access under article IV of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty.
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This system would be buttressed by the automatic imposition
of strong sanctions against nations acting outside the regime. The
current framework' does not sufficiently apprise states of the consequences of their acts, and the vagueness of what constitutes a
violation could permit political factors to intrude. While such political considerations will always be a factor in today's world, they can
be minimized by declaring certain specific acts as ipso facto
"significant for nonpeaceful purposes," thereby triggering sanctions. Such acts would include, among other things, the construction of laboratory-scale reprocessing facilities, the expulsion of
IAEA inspectors, and the diversion of material. The consequences
of any of these actions is sufficiently great to justify, at a minimum,
the cutoff of all nuclear cooperation with that nation. Since nearly
all states are dependent on others in one manner or another for
nuclear-related materials, fuels, and equipment, such an action
could effectively cripple the transgressor's ability to use its nuclear
capacity. Individual states, of course, would remain free to impose
broader sanctions. 62
B. Enactment of the Proposal
Several comments on this proposal are in order. It is designed
to be as simple to implement as possible. In fact, it could be included within the existing legal regime through the deposit of letters
with the International Atomic Energy Agency.6 3 This would permit
governments to compromise more easily than would otherwise be
the case. What matters is not the grandiosity of design but the
function it serves in stabilizing the regime. This proposal is also
based on the proposition that indigenous facilities should be discouraged, even if they exist in Treaty member states. Current repro161. Under the IAEA statute, Agency inspectors report any safeguard violations to the
Director General who thereupon transmits the report to the Board of Governors. The Board
calls upon the recipient state or states to remedy forthwith any noncompliance that it finds
to have occurred. The Board reports the noncompliance to all members and to the Security
Council and General Assembly of the United Nations. In the event the recipient state or states
fail to take fully corrective action within a reasonable time, the Board may take one or both
of the following measures: directly curtail or suspend assistance being provided by the Agency
or by a member, and call for the return of materials and equipment made available to the
recipient member or group of members. The Agency may also, in accordance with article
XIX, suspend any noncomplying member from the exercise of the privileges and rights of
membership. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, supra note 8, art. XII(C),
8 U.S.T. at 1107, 276 U.N.T.S. at 28. The Non-Proliferation Treaty has no independent
sanctions apart from these.
162. See notes 71-72 supra and accompanying text (discussion of 42 U.S.C.A. § 2158

(West Supp. I 1978)).

163. This is the method used in announcing the "Zangger List." See note 46 supra.
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cessors should make fuel cycle services so attractive that other nations will not spend the resources necessary to develop them. Similarly, current reprocessors should seek to ensure that states complying with their nonproliferation obligations have a right to expect a
reliable flow of needed nuclear materials, fuel, and equipment.
Since, as a practical matter, one cannot stop the construction of
reprocessing facilities, and since all members of the NonProliferation Treaty legally have a right of access to its technology,
the proposal seeks to define conditions under which access may
acceptably occur. Aside from their technical and economic efficiencies, multinational centers under this proposal would have a number of safeguard barriers not present in national facilities. The
practical impossibility of foreclosing the national option, however,
makes the inclusion of such facilities within the regime a necessity.
Underlying the entire system is the notion that proliferation is
more likely to occur the less nations cooperate with each other. A
high degree of interdependence gives the world majority that opposes proliferation significant leverage in discouraging it. Thus,
relying on the fact that nations are more prone to moderation when
they need outside assistance, this proposed regime would encourage
international cooperation so that nations become even more dependent on other states. This is especially important when erring means
the cutoff of a commodity vital to future economic growth. As a
practical matter, almost all of the suppliers are also recipients for
at least one portion of the fuel cycle. This dependency should be
further encouraged. Such a course would not only preserve resources, but also would ultimately be one of the best barriers against
proliferation.
Finally, the proposed regime is fashioned so that individual
nations can take steps within its framework that would provide
added incentives for prospective reprocessors to forego that option.
The United States, for instance, could consistent with its obligations under this regime: (1) make fuel supplies almost automatic to
Treaty states, with some form of binding arbitration in case of
delay; (2) offer fuel cycle services at discounted rates;'" (3) create
inducements aimed at alleviating spent fuel storage problems
and/or waste management concerns; (4) accept the same safeguards
on its reprocessing facilities as non-nuclear-weapons states;6 5 (5)
164. The United States would continue to have significant leverage to pursue its nonproliferation objective because it is required by law to charge at cost rather than at a commercial rate. See 42 U.S.C. § 2073 (1976).
165. The United States and the United Kingdom already have made voluntary offers
to accept IAEA safeguards on their peaceful programs. See Doub & Dukert, supra note 16,
at 758-59.
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serve as a back-up supplier if other nations do not provide services
for political reasons;"' and (6) operate the reprocessing facility at
Barnwell, South Carolina, as a multinational facility.6 7 The United
States, or any other nation, would not be free, however, to impose
additional safeguard requirements other than those enumerated in
the proposal.
VII. CoNcLusIoN
In a more leisurely period the law could, as Mr. Justice Holmes
suggested it should, lag behind the times. The rapid scientific and
technical development of today's world, however, has been accompanied by the notion that such development should be governed by
certain preexisting legal guidelines. Whether this notion is beneficial is beyond the scope of this Article. It is nonetheless clear that
international nuclear commerce will lack the stability necessary for
its safe expansion unless nations reach a new consensus. A complex
subject such as nuclear energy will always involve a degree of uncertainty. Today, however, that uncertainty is far too great.
The lesson of Nemesis, the Greek goddess of retributive justice
who sometimes punished persons by fulfilling their wishes too completely, should not go unheeded. If a nation or a group of nations
decides unilaterally to impose stringent new safeguard conditions or
to forego international nuclear commerce altogether in order to
avoid nuclear proliferation, it (or they) will not be directly responsible for the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. Such actions,
however, are likely to go unheeded as other nations seek to lessen
their dependence on foreign energy sources. These nations may perceive the problem differently and, although equally opposed to the
spread of nuclear weapons, may consider different means of prevention more attractive or efficacious. The final result might be a world
nuclear market so splintered that no set of controls is effective. In
this event those nations that had originally tried to control the
market unilaterally or to withdraw from it entirely would have lost
whatever influence they might once have had and would thus, at
least indirectly, have helped to create the very evil they most
wanted to avoid.
The proposal set forth in the preceding section of this Article
admittedly is no full solution to the problem of preventing the
166. The present alternatives being discussed, such as an international fuel bank or fuel
authority, are probably too grandiose to be implemented. See NucEnA FUEL, Feb. 6, 1978,
at 2. It would be simpler to have existing enrichers pledge that they will maintain a certain
excess capacity and to allow them to sign contracts on a back-up basis.
167. The Carter Administration has adamantly opposed such efforts in the past.
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spread of nuclear weapons. Just as important as the control over
nuclear materials and technology is the political effort to provide
nations with sufficient security so that they perceive little need to
develop or acquire nuclear weapons. This Article does assert, however, that a necessary part of any full solution is the cooperative
development of a new international consensus regarding the policies
governing the international nuclear market and the means to effectuate these policies. Based on the success of the regime that governed the international nuclear market from 1954 to 1973, the
awareness of new needs engendered by changes in the world energy
market since 1973, and the present willingness, both within and
without the United States, to respond to new proposals, there is
good reason to rely on international cooperation rather than unilateral activity in developing a stable international nuclear regime.

